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Abstract
Ruminative thought is a style of thinking which involves repetitively focusing upon one’s own
negative mood, its causes and its consequences. The negative effects of rumination are
well-documented, but comparatively little is known about how rumination is experienced.
The evaluative nature of rumination suggests that it could involve more inner speech than
non-ruminative states. The present study (N = 31) combined facial electromyography and
self-report questionnaires to determine the type of inner experience that occurs in rumina-
tion. The results showed that induced rumination involved similar levels of muscle activity
related to inner speech as periods of induced distraction. However, experience sampling
and questionnaire responses showed that rumination involved more verbal thought, and
also involved more evaluative and dialogic inner speech than distraction. These findings
contribute to the understanding of inner speech as a flexible phenomenon and confirms the
importance of employing multiple methods to investigate inner speech. Future research
should clarify the link between inner speech in rumination and its negative effects on
wellbeing.
Introduction
Rumination describes a style of thinking that commonly occurs as a maladaptive response to
distress and negative mood [1, 2]. Instead of actively engaging with the problems at hand,
ruminative thought involves passively and repetitively evaluating one’s own distressing mood,
its causes and consequences. Perhaps unsurprisingly, engaging in rumination is closely linked
with the onset and maintenance of depression (e.g. [3]) and inducing rumination in partici-
pants with depression can directly exacerbate negative mood [4–8]. Furthermore, rumination
prompts pessimistic thought patterns [9] and impairs social problem-solving and executive
functioning [10–12]. Although a great deal is known about the effects of rumination,
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comparatively little is known about the underlying mechanisms of the ruminative experience.
Understanding the mechanisms of rumination can inform targeted treatments to alleviate the
negative effects of ruminative thought. Rumination may consist primarily of “verbal thought”,
or inner speech, which can be simply defined as the act of talking to oneself in the mind (for a
review, see [13]). Inner speech most frequently consists of self-focused evaluations and
thoughts about emotional states [14]. It therefore seems likely that rumination, defined as self-
focused, repetitive and negative thoughts, involves more inner speech than non-ruminative
states.
The current literature examining the inner experience of rumination has largely employed
experience-sampling and interview methodologies. Experience-sampling is a term that
describes a diverse range of techniques aimed at capturing experiences in the moment [15].
These approaches have revealed that rumination involves a broad range of processes but may
involve more verbal thought than non-ruminative states. In two experiments McLaughlin,
Borkovec and Sibrava [16] interrupted participants regularly during a period of induced rumi-
nation and asked whether their mental content consisted of primarily verbal-linguistic
thought, primarily visual imagery, or something “other”. Across the two experiments, an aver-
age of 65.5% of experience samples collected during rumination reported verbal-linguistic
thought. A significant proportion of samples collected during rumination reported visual
imagery (31.6%), suggesting that rumination is not exclusively a verbal process. Reports of ver-
bal-linguistic thought were equally common during rumination and during a baseline period
of unguided thought, but other studies have found significantly more verbal thought during
periods of rumination compared to baseline [17, 18]. A limitation of experience sampling
methodologies is that they can fail to capture in-depth information about experiences [19].
Experience samples are brief and often require people to report their experience in accordance
with narrow, pre-defined criteria. Supporting evidence that rumination involves a diverse
range of experiences comes from interviews with people with depression about their rumina-
tive experiences [20]. Of thirty-eight participants, only two reported experiencing exclusively
verbal thoughts in rumination. Rumination was experienced “as a feeling” by 76.3% of partici-
pants, with visual (52.6%) and auditory (42.1%) experiences also being common. Depressive
thoughts, which overlap significantly with ruminative thoughts, involve a range of sensory
experiences [21, 22]. Depressed patients describe their depressive cognitions as frequently
involving bodily, auditory and visual sensations [22]. In a large non-clinical sample, 38.9% of
participants reported having only verbal thoughts in depressive thoughts, whilst a majority
reported having visual imagery in depressive thoughts, either with or without accompanying
verbal thoughts [21]. A combination of findings from experience-sampling and in-depth
reports of rumination therefore strongly suggest that although rumination might involve ver-
bal thought, it is not exclusively verbal. However, it is still unclear if rumination involves more
verbal thought than non-ruminative states.
An alternative approach to investigating whether rumination involves inner speech is to
examine physiological changes associated with verbal thought. Inner speech is often accompa-
nied by articulatory movements of speech muscles, which can be detected using electromyog-
raphy (EMG). For example, silent reading is accompanied by elevated levels of activity in the
upper (orbicularis oris superior) and lower (orbicularis oris inferior) lip muscles, compared to
rest [23]. This implies that the measurement of articulatory movements can provide a physio-
logical marker of inner speech production. In support of the view that rumination involves
inner speech, a recent study found that lip muscles were more active during a period of
induced rumination compared to rest, and guided relaxation of those same muscles reduced
self-reported rumination [24]. Although this study suggests that rumination involves more lip
muscle activity than rest, this may be due to the extra effort required to guide one’s own
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thoughts. Typically, the effects of induced rumination are compared to a period of induced dis-
traction. Distraction can be thought of as an alternative to rumination as a response to negative
mood. It involves directing attention away from negative mood to focus on emotionally-neu-
tral or positive thoughts [2]. Engaging in distraction involves a similar amount of effort to
engaging in rumination and therefore provides a more appropriate comparison than a period
of rest [25]. Furthermore, naturally occurring rumination can still occur during a period of
rest, whereas distraction actively inhibits rumination [11, 25]. The initial aim of the present
study was to extend the findings of Nalborczyk et al. [24] by comparing inner speech related
muscle activity during induced rumination and induced distraction.
Inner speech is a highly flexible and varied phenomenon, and people frequently report
experiencing condensed or fragmentary forms of inner speech in questionnaire surveys [26,
27].These variations may not be easily identifiable when using physiological measures of inner
speech. Alderson-Day & Fernyhough [13] argue that much of the time, inner speech could be
a basic, condensed representation containing abstract semantic, syntactic and phonological
information, which only becomes expanded and more articulated under certain conditions
(e.g. in responses to stress or task difficulty). Two key points arise from this theory when con-
sidering whether rumination involves more inner speech than non-ruminative states. Firstly,
rumination may be expected to prompt a particular kind of expanded inner speech which
involves articulation. Secondly, measuring muscle activity is only one way of assessing whether
inner speech is taking place during rumination. Investigations need to make use of multiple
methods in order to ascertain not only the extent to which rumination involves inner speech,
but also what type of inner speech takes places during rumination [28].
In order to determine the extent to which rumination involves inner speech, the present
study compared self-reports of inner experience with physiological correlates of articulation
during induced rumination and distraction. Experience samples were taken during periods of
induced rumination and distraction to determine the extent to which those experiences
involved verbal thought and to investigate the type of inner speech that occurs during these
two different states. It was expected that rumination would involve more verbal thought than a
period of distraction, and that this verbal thought would involve more evaluative and
expanded inner speech. After each period, a questionnaire assessed the type of inner speech
which took place. Finally, EMG recorded speech-related (OOI, OOS) and emotion-related
(frontalis, FRO) muscle activity during periods of rumination, distraction and unguided
thought. It was expected that rumination would involve more speech and emotion-related
muscle activity than distraction and a baseline period of unguided thought. This would suggest
that rumination involves more inner speech than non-ruminative states which require similar
levels of cognitive effort (distraction), adding to previous findings that rumination involves
more physiological correlates of inner speech than periods of rest [24]. Questionnaire mea-
sures of trait anxiety, depression and rumination were also included as potential confounding
variables.
Method
Participants
31 participants (6 males), aged 18–29 (M = 20.09, SD = 1.78) took part in the study in exchange
for course credit. The majority of participants identified as White British (58%) and White
Other (19.4%). Ethical approval was given by Department of Psychology Ethics Sub-commit-
tee at Durham University. Informed written consent was given by all participants. Participants
had no history of psychiatric, developmental or neurological disorder.
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Measures
Varieties of inner speech questionnaire revised edition (VISQ-R; [29]). The 26-item
questionnaire was used to measure the frequency at which different types of inner speech
occur during the preceding thought period. Items are rated on a Likert scale from 1 (“Never”)
to 7 (“All the Time”). Factor analyses of the questionnaire have found that each item loads
onto one of five varieties of inner speech: condensed/expanded, dialogic, other people, evalua-
tive and positive/regulatory. The present study used an adapted 10-item version of the
VISQ-R, with two items taken from each factor. Items with the highest factor loadings in pre-
vious studies [29] on each subscale were selected, examples of which are presented in Table 1.
Positive and negative affect scale (PANAS-NA; [30]). The ‘negative affect’ subscale of
the PANAS was used to assess negative affect [30]. This is a 10-item questionnaire and each
item is rated on a scale from 1 (“Very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“Extremely”).
Rumination and mood scale. Self-report levels of rumination and mood were measured
with a series of eight statements. Four of these statements were about different aspects of rumi-
nation (e.g. “At this moment I am thinking about my negative things”; adapted from Nalborc-
zyk et al., [24]). The four rumination questions concern the extent to which the participant is
thinking is about their feelings, about negative things, about problems and also how self-
focused their thoughts are. The remaining four were about positive and negative mood of the
participant (e.g. “At this moment, I am happy”; adapted from [31]). Participants were asked to
rate how much each statement currently applied to them from 0 to 100, with 0 being “Not at
all” and 100 being “Definitely applies to me”.
Hospital anxiety and depression scale (HADS; [32]). This 14-item questionnaire mea-
sures trait anxiety and depression and consists of seven items related to anxiety (HADS-A)
and seven items related to depression (HADS-D). The scale is frequently used to assess both
anxiety and depression and shows satisfactory psychometric properties [32].
Mini cambridge-exeter repetitive thought scale (mini-CERTS [33]). Trait rumination
was measured with this 16-item questionnaire. The mini-CERTS consists of two subscales
measuring concrete, experiential thinking and abstract, analytical thinking, otherwise termed
as constructive and unconstructive thoughts [33] Items are rated on a Likert scale from 1
(“Almost Never”) to 4 (“Almost Always”).
Behavioural tasks
Negative mood induction. Participants completed two tasks, an anagram task and a sub-
traction task. Both tasks were designed to be difficult to complete, in order to ensure negative
mood induction and have previously been used to induce negative affect as part of a rumina-
tion induction procedure [34]. In the anagram task, twenty anagrams were presented on a
computer screen for a maximum of thirty seconds each. The anagrams were presented in a
fixed order and participants wrote their solutions on an answer sheet provided. If the partici-
pant found the solution before that time, or if they found an anagram too difficult, they could
Table 1. Examples of items from the VISQ-R for each subscale.
Subscale Examples
Dialogic “I was going back and forward asking myself questions and then answering them.”
Evaluative “In my head, I talked to myself in a critical way.”
Condensed “My thinking to myself was like shorthand notes, rather than full, proper, grammatical English.”
Positive “My inner speech helped calm me down.”
Other People “I experienced the voices of other people asking me questions in my head.”
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238920.t001
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skip to the next anagram by pressing a keyboard button. Participants were encouraged to solve
as many anagrams as possible in five minutes. Unbeknownst to the participants, six of the ana-
grams (30%) were unsolvable [35]. None of the participants reached the final anagram in the
given time. The anagram task was presented in E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pitts-
burgh, PA). In the subtraction task, participants were asked to count backwards from the num-
ber “2083” in steps of thirteen. If an error was made, the experimenter stopped the participant
and asked them to start again from “2083”. Participants were encouraged to try to get as far as
possible within the five-minute time limit. None of the participants reached 0 in the given time.
Rumination and distraction induction. Rumination and distraction were induced by
prompting participants to think of a certain topic for six minutes. In the rumination condition,
participants were prompted to “Please think about the causes, consequences and meanings of
your current feelings”. In the distraction condition, participants were prompted to “Please
think about a village, city or town that you are particularly familiar with”. To reduce the possi-
bility of silent reading affecting the EMG recording, the related prompt for each condition was
displayed as a single sentence on the screen for five seconds [24]. After the initial prompt, the
screen displayed only a fixation cross in the centre of the screen. During each six-minute
thought period, participants were interrupted every 85–95 seconds (randomised) for an expe-
rience sampling phase, in which they answered five questions presented on the computer
screen. At each experience sampling phase, participants rated the extent to which what went
through their mind in the previous period could be described as thoughts, images, past-ori-
ented, present-oriented or future-oriented (e.g. “During the previous period, how much of
what went through your mind could be described as Thoughts/Images/Past-Oriented/Present-
Oriented/Future-Oriented?”) [16, 17]. In the instructions, thoughts were defined as “words
that you say to yourself” and images were defined as “pictures in your mind”. Each response
was rated on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being “Did not occur at all’ and 10 being “Occurred all
the time”. Following these questions, participants were again shown the prompt for five sec-
onds, followed by a fixation cross until the next experience sampling phase. Each thought
period included four experience sampling phases. The thought induction instructions and
probes were presented in E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).
Electromyography
Electrode placement & preparation. Muscle activity was recorded from the orbicularis
oris superior (OOS) and orbicularis oris inferior (OOI) lip muscles and the frontalis (FRO)
brow muscle (as in Nalborczyk et al. [24]). Electrodes were placed according to recommenda-
tions on the optimal placement of surface EMG electrodes (see Fig 1). The locations of the
OOS and OOI were identified as midway between the facial midline and the corner of the
mouth, and as close as possible to the lip vermillion, on the upper lip and lower lip respectively
[36]. The location of the FRO was defined as 1cm above the brow, in line with the pupil [37].
Two AgCL electrode discs with a diameter of 4mm were placed either side of each location,
0.5cm apart. Once the electrodes had been attached, participants were asked to make gestures
which have previously been shown to elicit activity in the relevant muscles [37, 38]. If these
movements failed to produce obvious activity in the EMG signal, the electrode placements
were inspected and altered to capture muscle activity more accurately. For safety purposes and
to further minimise electrical noise, an unshielded grounding electrode was placed on the
upper forehead. To optimise recordings of speech and emotion-related muscle activity, the lip
muscle electrodes were placed on the dominant side of the face (e.g. right side for right-handed
people), and the brow muscle electrodes were placed on the non-dominant side (e.g. left side
for right-handed people), as previous research has shown that emotion-related facial muscle
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activity is more prominent on the non-dominant side of the face, and speech-related muscle
activity on the dominant side of the face [39]. Prior to electrode placement, skin preparation
gel (NuPrep Skin Prep Gel, Weaver & Company, Aurora, USA) and 70% isopropyl alcohol
were applied to the relevant locations to reduce impedance and ensure optimal signal strength.
Data recording. EMG signals were recorded with a surface electromyography system
(MP150, BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Goleta, CA, USA). Muscle activity from the FRO, OOS and
OOI muscles were amplified by the surface electromyography system with a gain of 2000hz
and filtered with a pass band of 10hz to 500hz. Data from each muscle were recorded
Fig 1. The points indicate where the electrodes were placed for each participant. Electrodes 2–3 recorded signals
from the Frontalis muscle. Electrodes 4–5 recorded signals from the orbicularis oris superior muscle. Electrodes 6–7
recorded signals from the orbicularis oris inferior muscle. Electrode 1 was an unshielded grounding electrode.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238920.g001
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separately at a sampling rate of 2000 samples per second using AcqKnowledge software (Acq-
Knowledge 4, BIOPAC Systems, Inc, Goleta, CA, USA). To mark the onset and offset of each
thought-induction period, a digital timing pulse was recorded in AcqKnowledge from the
E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) via a parallel port connec-
tion. During EMG recording, video and audio recordings of the participant were taken using a
webcam (Logitech c270, Logitech, Lausanne, Switzerland) and microphone (Zoom H2n,
Zoom Corporation, Tokyo, Japan). Video and audio recordings were inspected later for the
removal of obvious movements that were not the target of investigation in this study, accord-
ing to the guidelines followed by previous research [24].
Procedure
After consenting to take part, participants completed the HADS, mini-CERTS, PANAS-NA
and the Rumination and Mood Scale. The EMG system was set up, and baseline measures of
muscle activity were recorded during a period in which participants were asked to remain
silent and to not move for one minute. The participants then completed the two negative
mood induction tasks, after which participants once again completed the PANAS-NA ques-
tionnaire and the Rumination and Mood Scale. Following the negative mood induction, rumi-
nation and distraction were induced, the order of which was counterbalanced between
participants. After each induction task, participants completed the VISQ-R, as well as the
Rumination and Mood Scale.
Analysis
All questionnaire and experience sampling analyses were conducted using SPSS (IBM SPSS
Statistics for Windows, Version 22.0., IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA). Unless otherwise
reported, the inclusion of order in which the conditions were completed as a between-subjects
variable as part of a mixed-design ANOVA produced no significant main effects or interac-
tions involving order.
Manipulation checks
Negative mood induction. To check for the effect of mood induction, PANAS-NA scores
and the four ratings of mood were compared pre- and post-mood induction with paired sam-
ple t-tests with an adjusted alpha level of 0.01 following a Bonferroni correction for five com-
parisons. It was expected that negative mood would be increased, and positive mood would be
decreased following mood induction.
Thought induction. To determine the effect of the two thought induction procedures,
ratings of the four rumination statements were compared post-rumination and post-distrac-
tion with paired sample t-tests, with an adjusted alpha level of 0.0125 following a Bonferroni
correction for four comparisons. It was expected that the induction of rumination would lead
to heightened ratings of ruminative thought compared to the distraction induction.
Self-reported inner experience
VISQ-R. Items from each subscale of the VISQ-R (Dialogic, Evaluative, Condensed, Posi-
tive, Other People) were summed together, to produce five VISQ-R scores for each condition,
for each participant. One participant failed to provide scores for two of the ten VISQ-R Items
following the distraction thought period, one item from the Dialogic subscale and one item
from the Condensed subscale. The missing values of these items were replaced with the mean
item scores derived from the rest of the sample. Subscale scores were compared between
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conditions using a paired sample t-test, with an adjusted alpha level of 0.01 following a Bonfer-
roni correction for five comparisons. It was expected that rumination would be rated as involv-
ing more evaluative, and less condensed inner speech than distraction.
Experience samples. The average score across each condition was calculated for each
experience sample question (Images, Thoughts, Past-Oriented, Present-Oriented and Future-
Oriented). These were compared between rumination and distraction using a paired sample t-
test, with an adjusted alpha level of 0.01 following a Bonferroni correction for five compari-
sons. It was expected that rumination would be rated as involving more thoughts, whereas dis-
traction would involve higher ratings for imagery.
Electromyography
Three participants were excluded from EMG analyses due to equipment failure, one due to
excessive electrical noise, and two due to hardware failures. Data pre-processing was con-
ducted in AcqKnowledge software. EMG data within rumination and distraction were taken
from the 20 second periods prior to each experience sample, as marked by the digital signal,
and concatenated, resulting in an 80 second period of data for each condition. The decision to
use the final 20 seconds of each thought period was made to maximise comparability with pre-
vious research investigating muscle activity in rumination, which recorded EMG during the
final minute of a five-minute induction period [24]. Baseline recordings involved the full 60
seconds of EMG recording during baseline. Audio and video recordings were recorded in sync
with the EMG recordings. The corresponding EMG data of any obvious movement or sound
made by the participant were removed based on inspection of the audio and video recordings.
Two participants were excluded from further analysis due to excessive movements. In the
remaining dataset (n = 26), 8.62% of the data were removed following inspection, and three of
the participants had more than 40% of their data removed (41.34%, 51.18% and 50.22%). An
FIR filter with Kaiser Bessel windowing was applied to the remaining data, with a band pass fil-
ter of 20Hz-450Hz [38].
The pre-processed data were exported to MATLAB (MATLAB r2016a, The MathWorks,
Inc., Natick, MA, USA) from Acknowledge. The data were rectified, and the peak amplitude of
each muscle (FRO, OOS, OOI) in each condition (Rumination, Distraction and Baseline) for
each participant was calculated. Peak values were used as opposed to mean values because the
effects of interest were very small, unobservable muscle movements and a mean value would
result in these signals being lost amidst the noise of the signal. These peak values were then
natural log transformed in order to smooth the data and reduce the impact on the EMG signal
of individual differences in muscle movements [40]. All further EMG analyses were conducted
in SPSS. A repeated measures ANOVA with condition (Rumination, Distraction, Baseline) as
the within-subjects factor was conducted for data from each muscle separately. It was expected
that muscle activity in the FRO, OOI and OOS muscles would be heightened in the rumination
condition compared to the distraction condition.
Results
Mean scores for the HADS-A (Mean = 7.13, SD = 3.72) and HADS-D (Mean = 2.81,
SD = 2.55) were below the recommended cut-off scores for possible cases of anxiety and
depression [41].
Manipulation checks
Negative mood induction. The mean and standard deviations of each mood score pre-
and post-mood-induction are presented in Table 2. No significant differences were found for
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the overall PANAS-NA score (t(30) = -0.38, p = 0.704, d = 0.069). There were also no signifi-
cant differences in the ratings of the negative mood statements related to ‘upset’ (t(30) = -1.74,
p = 0.092, d = 0.312) and ‘sad’ (t(30) = -0.85, p = 0.402, d = 0.153) mood. However, there was a
significant reduction in both the ‘happy’ (t(30) = 4.23, p< 0.001, d = 0.76) and ‘optimistic’
(t(30) = 3.56, p = 0.001, d = 0.639) ratings following the negative mood induction.
Self-reported rumination. Table 3 shows means and standard deviations of the ratings of
statements related to ruminative thought following each induction. Ratings were significantly
higher for Feelings (t(30) = 3.165, p = 0.004, d = 0.568), Negative Things (t(30) = 3.776,
p = 0.001, d = 0.678) and Problems (t(30) = 4.254, p< 0.001, d = 0.764) items in the rumina-
tion condition, compared to the distraction condition. Ratings of Self-Focus were not signifi-
cantly different between conditions after controlling for multiple comparisons (t(30) = 2.585,
p = 0.015, d = 0.464).
Total score on the CERTS scale significantly correlated only with the Problems item during
both rumination (r = 0.444, p = 0.012) and distraction (r = 0.518, p = 0.03). Scores on the
CERTS did not significantly correlate with any other self-reported rumination measure.
Inner experience
Varieties of inner speech. It was expected that rumination would involve more verbal
thought than a period of distraction, and that this verbal thought would involve more evalua-
tive and expanded inner speech. Table 4 shows means and standard deviations of the ratings of
varieties of inner speech (VISQ-R) in rumination and distraction. Ratings of Dialogic and
Evaluative inner speech were significantly higher in the rumination condition than in the dis-
traction condition (t(30) = 5.977, p< 0.001 d = 1.073; t(30) = 4.509, p< 0.001, d = 0.81). No
other subscales showed a significant difference (all t(30) < 1.5, all p> 0.14, all d< 0.266).
To determine if the order of the two inductions influenced inner speech, order was
included as a between-subjects variable as part of a mixed-design ANOVA for each of the
Table 2. Mean mood scores pre- and post-mood induction.
Pre-Mood Induction Post-Mood Induction
PANAS-NA 14.77 (4.41) 15.06 (3.59)
Sad 17.84 (20.41) 20 (18.37)
Upset 16.97 (22.34) 23.84 (23.01)
Happy� 64.90 (22.31) 51.97 (21.64)
Optimistic� 60.65 (21.71) 50.01 (21.96)
Standard deviations are reported in brackets.
� indicates that the comparison is significant at the Bonferroni adjusted alpha level (p < 0.01).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238920.t002
Table 3. Mean self-reported rumination scores of rumination and distraction.
Rumination Distraction
Feelings� 75.58 (28.74) 61.29 (30.10)
Negative Things� 28.16 (25.61) 13.32 (20.14)
Self-Focus 68.45 (23.69) 56.52 (27.89)
Problems� 44.39 (33.10) 24.52 (25.48)
Standard deviations are reported in brackets.
� indicates that the comparison is significant at the Bonferroni adjusted alpha level (p < 0.0125).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238920.t003
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VISQ subscales. Although there were no significant main effects for order or induction type
for Condensed (F(1, 29) = 2.79, p = .106, m2p = .088; F(1, 29) = 3.055,p = .091, m
2
p = .095) or Posi-
tive (F(1, 29) = 2.53, p = .122, m2p = .08; F(1, 29) = .186, p = .669, m
2
p = .006) inner speech, there
were significant interactions for both subscales (F(1, 29) = 8.37, p = .007, m2p = .224; F(1, 29) =
4.90, p = .035, m2p = .145). Further analyses were conducted to clarify these significant interac-
tions, though it should be noted that some argue that significant interactions without corre-
sponding significant main effects are implausible and should be interpreted with caution [42].
Independent t-tests revealed that inner speech in the rumination condition was rated as more
Condensed if it was engaged in first, compared to if it was completed second (t(29) = 3.237,
p = 0.003, d = 1.163). The rumination condition was rated as involving more Positive inner
speech by those who engaged in rumination first, compared to those who completed rumina-
tion second (t(29) = 2.513, p = 0.018, d = 0.903). In summary, rumination tended to involve
more Condensed and Positive inner speech if engaged in first.
Experience sampling. Experience sampling was used to investigate the nature of inner
experience during periods of rumination and distraction. Means and standard deviations for
experience sample scores in rumination and distraction can be seen in Table 5. Rumination
produced significantly higher ratings than distraction in Thoughts (t(30) = -6.17, p< 0.001,
d = 1.108), Present-Oriented (t(30) = -5.097, p< 0.001, d = 0.916) and Future-Oriented (t(30)
= -5.11, p< 0.001, d = 0.917) experience samples. Distraction produced significantly higher
ratings than rumination on Images (t(30) = 9.95, p< 0.001, d = 1.787) and Past-Oriented (t
(30) = 7.72, p< 0.001, d = 1.387) experience samples.
Electromyography
Rumination was expected to involve more speech and emotion-related muscle activity than
distraction and a baseline period of unguided thought. The mean values of the log-transformed
Table 4. Mean scores on the varieties of inner speech questionnaire.
Rumination Distraction
Dialogic� 9.03 (2.24) 6.69 (2.39)
Evaluative� 7.39 (2.25) 5.35 (2.43)
Condensed 5.94 (3.32) 6.93 (3.39)
Positive 8.26 (2.46) 8.03 (2.15)
Other People 3.32 (2.10) 3.23 (2.32)
Standard deviations are reported in brackets.
� indicates that the comparison is significant at the Bonferroni adjusted alpha level (p < 0.01).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238920.t004
Table 5. Mean scores on experience samples.
Rumination Distraction
Images� 3.82 (2.20) 7.41 (2.00)
Thoughts� 7.95 (1.41) 6.02 (2.00)
Past-Oriented� 4.05 (1.92) 7.02 (1.59)
Present-Oriented� 6.71 (4.12) 2.80 (1.52)
Future-Oriented� 5.29 (1.95) 3.06 (2.28)
Standard deviations are in brackets.
� indicates that the comparison is significant at the Bonferroni adjusted alpha level (p < 0.01).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238920.t005
PLOS ONE Inner experience in rumination
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238920 September 14, 2020 10 / 17
peak amplitudes for each muscle in each condition can be seen in Fig 1. Three one-way ANO-
VAs were carried out to investigate the difference in muscle activity between the FRO, OOI
and OOS muscle activity in the rumination, distraction and baseline conditions. The mean val-
ues of the log-transformed peak amplitudes for each muscle in each condition can be seen in
Fig 2. For FRO muscle activity, the assumption of sphericity was violated and Greenhouse-
Geisser values are therefore reported. A significant main effect of condition (F(1.531, 38.227) =
8.487, p = 0.002, m2p = 0.253) was found. Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction applied
revealed a significant difference in FRO muscle activity between rumination and distraction
(p = .006) and between rumination and baseline (p = .020). There was no significant difference
between distraction and baseline (p>.05). This suggests that the FRO muscle was more active
during the rumination condition compared to both the distraction and baseline conditions.
The mean peak log values for the OOS muscle can be seen in Fig 1. Muscle activity from the
OOS showed no significant main effect of condition (F(2, 50) = 2.395, p = 0.102, m2p = 0.087).
The mean peak log values for the OOI muscle can be seen in Fig 1. Muscle activity from the
OOI showed a significant main effect of condition (F(2, 50) = 6.258, p = 0.004, m2p = 0.201).
Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction applied revealed a significant difference between
rumination and baseline conditions (p = .013) and distraction and baseline conditions (p =
.049). No significant difference in OOI muscle activity was found between rumination and dis-
traction (p>.05). This suggests that the OOI muscle was more active during the rumination
and distraction conditions than during the baseline condition.
It was expected that lip muscles would show increased activity during the period of induced
rumination compared to distraction. The findings instead supported the null hypothesis that
rumination and distraction involve similar levels of lip muscle activity. One possible explana-
tion is that the study is underpowered. The average effect size previously reported for compar-
ing muscle activity between a period of rumination and rest is d = 0.72 [24]. A power analysis
Fig 2. The average of the log-transformed peak amplitudes of the frontalis (FRO), orbicularis oris inferior (OOI)
and orbicularis oris superior (OOS) muscles, in each of the experimental conditions (Baseline, Distraction,
Rumination). A higher value indicates heightened muscle activity. The FRO showed significantly heightened muscle
activity in rumination compared to distraction and baseline. The OOI muscle showed significantly heightened muscle
activity in rumination and distraction compared to baseline. The OOS muscle showed no significant difference
between the conditions. Error bars are standard errors from the mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238920.g002
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conducted with an equivalent f-test effect size of f = 0.36, with 80% power and an alpha of 0.05,
estimated a sample size of 40, therefore it is possible that the sample size of the present study
lacked sufficient power to detect the effect of rumination on muscle activity. In order to test
this, a Bayesian paired samples t-test was conducted for the peak log values of muscle activity
between the rumination and distraction conditions. This revealed strong evidence in favour of
the alternative hypothesis for the FRO muscle (B10 = 18.79), and moderate evidence in favour
of the null hypothesis for the OOS (B10 = 0.232) and OOI (B10 = 0.278) muscles, according to
current guidelines for interpreting Bayes factors [43].
Discussion
The initial aim of the present study was to extend the findings of Nalborczyk et al. [24], by
investigating the differences in muscle activity between induced rumination and induced dis-
traction. A second and broader aim of the study was to compare self-reported measures and
physiological correlates of inner speech during induced rumination, to determine what type of
inner experience takes place in rumination.
Comparisons of peak muscle activations revealed that the brow muscle frontalis was signifi-
cantly more active during a period of rumination, compared to distraction and a baseline period
of rest. The lower lip muscle orbicularis oris inferior was significantly more active during rumina-
tion compared to baseline, whereas the upper lip muscle orbicularis oris superior showed no signif-
icant difference in activity between the three conditions. The frontalis muscle is associated with
negative mood [37], and was therefore expected to show heightened activity during rumination.
As in Nalborczyk et al. [24], the present study found that lower lip muscles are more active during
rumination compared to rest but extends this research by finding that both lower and upper lip
muscles showed no more activation during rumination when compared to a period of distraction.
Distraction was included as a control condition, in addition to a baseline condition of rest, to
determine if elevated lip muscle activity is specific to rumination, or if it is due to the effort
required to guide one’s own thoughts. Given that lip muscle activity has previously been related to
inner speech production [23], this suggests that rumination has no specific boost of inner speech
production relative to distraction. The increase in lip-muscle activity during states where thoughts
were guided (rumination, distraction), compared to rest may therefore reflect the extra effort
required to guide one’s thoughts and to engage in inner speech production.
Whilst the EMG findings appear to suggest that rumination and distraction involve inner
speech to a similar degree, self-report measures revealed striking differences in how each
thought period was experienced. Experience sampling found that participants reported signifi-
cantly more verbal thought during rumination than distraction, and significantly more imag-
ery during distraction than rumination. This is in line with previous research which
demonstrated that rumination is a primarily verbal phenomenon [17]. Furthermore, a ques-
tionnaire assessing the variety of inner speech showed that rumination involved more evalua-
tive and dialogic inner speech than distraction. Ruminative thinking is frequently defined as
an evaluative mode of thought [2], but no previous study has suggested that rumination should
preferentially engage dialogic inner speech. An order effect was found for the condensed and
positive subscales of the VISQ-R. Rumination involved less condensed inner speech when
engaged in after the distraction condition, and more positive inner speech when engaged in
before the distraction condition. Lower scores on the condensed inner speech subscale of the
VISQ-R can be interpreted as indexing higher levels of expanded inner speech, since these
forms of inner speech are conceived of as representing poles on a continuum [29, 44]. Our
findings suggest that rumination involves an expanded form of inner speech, but only when
following a period of distraction.
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It is noteworthy that although a physiological correlate of inner speech evidenced no differ-
ences between rumination and distraction, there were differences in self-reported inner speech
between these two conditions. This suggests that the measurement of articulatory movements
failed to adequately capture the variety in the experience of inner speech. There are several rea-
sons for caution when using articulatory movements alone as a marker for inner speech.
Firstly, previous studies have demonstrated that inner speech does not necessarily require
motor activity, implying that at least some inner speech cannot be detected with EMG. Indi-
viduals who are temporarily unable to produce speech-related movements, either through
muscle-paralysing injections [45] or neurostimulation [46] still report experiencing inner
speech. Secondly, inner speech can differ in form depending on the extent to which articula-
tory muscles are involved. Increasing the involvement of articulatory muscles by silently
mouthing during silent speech generation appears to affect the phonological detail of inner
speech representations [47]. This suggests that only certain types of inner speech, such as more
phonologically rich inner speech, may be detectable by EMG. This underlines that inner
speech is a highly variable phenomenon [12]. Future studies should ensure that any putative
physiological markers of inner speech, such as lip muscle activity, are accompanied by ques-
tionnaire methods which are sensitive to the phenomenological variability of inner speech. It
has previously been argued that multiple methods are necessary to comprehensively assess
inner speech [28]. The use of multiple methods in the present study allowed us to demonstrate
that rumination may involve a similar amount of inner speech to non-ruminative thought, but
with key differences in how it is experienced.
It was expected that rumination would involve more evaluative inner speech than distrac-
tion, given that is often defined as an evaluative mode of thought [2]. Rumination was also
rated as involving more dialogic inner speech than distraction. The Dialogic subscale of the
VISQ-R measures the extent to which inner speech resembles a conversation with either one-
self or another person in the mind [26, 29]. In a recent, revised version of the VISQ, scores on
the Dialogic subscale correlated with all other subscales, particularly Evaluative inner speech
[29]. This led the authors to claim that dialogic inner speech might represent a core feature of
inner speech, in accordance with Vygotskian theories of inner speech. Rumination in
depressed individuals most commonly consists of thoughts about relationships with other peo-
ple, and about how past events might have played out differently [20]. Previous research sug-
gests that these topics might preferentially engage dialogic inner speech. Firstly, dialogic inner
speech has been shown to activate the same brain regions associated with representing the
minds of others [48], and might therefore be particularly useful for social cognition. Secondly,
creative thoughts [49] and moral reasoning [50] are also thought to be closely related to dia-
logic inner speech, suggesting that re-imagining previous scenarios and subsequent conse-
quences might engage dialogic thinking.
A key limitation of the present study is that the negative mood induction did not produce an
increase in negative mood, although it did significantly decrease positive mood. Inducing rumina-
tion in non-clinical participants is most commonly achieved by inducing negative mood before
presenting prompts to ruminate. Indeed, the tasks used in the present study were chosen because
they have previously been used to induce negative mood as part of a rumination induction [34].
Many of the maladaptive effects of rumination only occur in people who are experiencing nega-
tive emotions prior to the prompt to ruminate [25]. For example, inducing rumination in
depressed patients exacerbates negative mood relative to distraction, but no such effect is found in
non-depressed controls [5]. These findings suggest that rumination occurring during negative
mood is very different from rumination occurring during neutral or positive emotional states,
and this might be reflected in how it is experienced. In the present study, self-report measures
indicated that participants ruminated more following the rumination induction than following
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the distraction induction, despite the limited impact of the mood induction. Moreover, the experi-
ence sampling analyses revealed that rumination consisted of similar levels of verbal thought and
visual imagery to those reported in previous studies [16, 17]. It therefore seems likely that the lack
of negative mood did not impact the efficacy of the rumination induction. A promising avenue of
future research would be to further investigate the experience of rumination when it arises from
negative mood compared to positive or neutral mood.
Another aim for future research should be to determine whether the different types of inner
speech employed in rumination and distraction can account for their differing impact on gen-
eral well-being. Rumination is considered to be a maladaptive response to negative mood,
whereas distraction is an alternative adaptive response [2]. Two aspects of the experience of
rumination reported in the present study may contribute to the detrimental impact of rumina-
tion on well-being. Firstly, rumination involved more experiences of verbal thought than dis-
traction. The use of verbal thought has previously been closely linked with negative mood.
People encouraged to think about hypothetical scenarios with verbal thought showed reduced
mood [51], and were more susceptible to a subsequent negative mood induction [52] than
those encouraged to think visually. Secondly, rumination employed more evaluative inner
speech than distraction. Evaluative inner speech is negatively associated with self-esteem [44].
The results of the present study suggest that excessive use of inner speech, particularly evalua-
tive inner speech, may be an underlying mechanism which leads to rumination, and subse-
quently its negative effects. Future research should directly investigate the link between inner
speech in rumination and well-being, and test targeted interventions for alleviating the nega-
tive effects of rumination by influencing inner speech.
In conclusion, induced rumination appeared to involve similar levels of inner speech-
related muscle activity to a period of distraction. However, self-reports revealed a considerable
difference in how ruminative and non-ruminative thoughts are experienced. Rumination con-
sisted of more verbal thoughts, as well as dialogic and evaluative inner speech, compared to a
period of distraction. The combined use of multiple methods revealed nuances to inner speech
in rumination that would have been missed by using either self-reports or EMG alone [29].
Specifically, this novel and comprehensive approach revealed that ruminative thinking
involves different kinds of inner speech to non-ruminative thought, but these different kinds
of inner speech are not clearly associated with speech-related muscle activity.
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